Long-run Performance of Public vs. Private Sector Initial Public Offerings in Pakistan by Muhammad Faisal Rizwan & Safi-ullah Khan
©The Pakistan Development Review 
46 : 4 Part II (Winter 2007) pp. 421–433      
Long-run Performance of Public vs. Private Sector  
Initial Public Offerings in Pakistan  
MUHAMMAD FAISAL RIZWAN and SAFI-ULLAH KHAN
*  
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The private sector had its major share in the economic development of the country 
in the early years of its independence in the 1950s. However, the private sector suffered a 
set back in the early 1970s, when a huge process of nationalisation of a large number of 
private industrial units was undertaken by the then government. Over the decades these 
enterprises  were  not  professionally  managed  and  the  political  influences  in  the 
management and running of these enterprises played havoc with them and consequently 
the experiment proved to be a failure. Attending to the weaknesses and inefficiencies 
inherent in the public sector enterprises, privatisation was systematically initiated by the 
then government in the early 1990s. Various privatisation commissions were set up in 
subsequent years and the privatisation process got some momentum during the present 
government and many large and profitable firms were privatised in the last few years, 
particularly  at  a  time  when  the  overall  climate  in  the  country  was  responsive  and 
conducive  for  investment.  The  government,  however,  privatised  many  enterprises 
through public offerings on individual-case basis.  
The  objectives  of  this  paper,  therefore,  are;  first,  to  what  degree  Privatisation 
Initial Public Offering’s (IPOs henceforth) and private sector IPOs differ in terms of 
under-pricing  in  Pakistan?  Second,  to  find  out  the  reasons  of  the  under-pricing  of 
Privatisation  and  private  sector  IPOs.  Third,  how  can  we  compare  the  long-run 
performance of Public and private sector IPOs?  
In Pakistan, firms employ the fixed-price method to go public and the shares are 
sold in lots with each lot consisting of 100, 200, 500 or multiple of these lots. An investor 
can  apply  for  only  one  lot  at  the  pre-announced  subscription  price.  In  case  of  over 
subscription of shares by the investors, the company reserves the rights to over subscribe 
up to a certain percentage of the pre-announced amount of equity. Empirical evidence for 
the Pakistan stock market is generally scarce. Especially, evidence on Pakistani Private 
sector IPOs is non-existent. Sohail and Nasr (2007) is the only study, to our knowledge, 
to have been conducted on the performance of IPOs in Pakistan, who investigated 50 
IPOs  during  the  period  2001  to  2005  that  subsequently  listed  on  the  Karachi  stock 
exchange. They find significant under pricing for Pakistani IPOs and reported an average  
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first  day  return  of  35.66  percent  for  subscribers.  In  analysing  the  longer-term 
performance of IPOs, Sohail and Nasr (2007) found a buy (at the closing price of the 
listing day) and hold (to the end of the twelfth month) strategy resulted in a mean –38.1 
percent  return  by  using  market  adjusted  model.  Their  study  of  new  equity  issues  in 
Pakistan market only examines initial performance and one-year long run performance. 
The major advantage of our paper relative to Sohail and Nasr (2007) is that the present 
paper  compares  the  performance  of  privatisation  IPOs  with  private  sector  IPOs  with 
major focus on how much government of Pakistan's privatisation program is successful 
and how private sector IPOs have performed relative to private sector IPOs. Moreover, 
this paper differs from Sohail and Nasr (2007) in several other important aspects. In 
addressing long run performance, the present study measures long run performance up to 
2  years  post  listing  to  facilitate  comparison  with  the  majority  of  previous  studies 
conducted  in  other  markets.  Given  the  relative  small  number  and  newness  of  the 
phenomenon of IPOs in Pakistan, a full analysis of IPO performance in the long and short 
run was not possible. However, a sort of preliminary study to examine pricing of Pakistan 
IPOs and comparison of Public sector IPOs and private sector IPOs in the short and long 
run is described in the balance of the paper.  
The results of the paper can be summarised as follows. First, the empirical results 
provide evidence that is consistent with some previous studies that document short-term 
excess returns associated with Initial Public Offerings. Additionally, results indicate that 
public sector IPOs are statistically significantly under priced more than the private sector 
IPOs. Second, a multivariate cross- sectional analysis reveals that, pure signalling models 
can not be used to explain the initial stock returns of Pakistani Public and private sector 
IPOs. Third, the initial excess returns of Public and private sector IPOs is positively 
related to the firm size which shows that Government of Pakistan sold large and well-
known enterprises at attractive issue prices for the general investors. Fourth, the long run 
performance of public sector IPOs has been remarkably better than the private sector 
IPOs in Pakistan’s market.  
The remaining portion of the paper is organised as follows. Next section briefly 
summarises the previous literature on the subject and lists the hypotheses to be tested 
about the price behaviour of Public and private sector IPOs. The third section describes 
the data and methodology and discusses empirical results of the study and section four 
concludes the paper.   
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
(a) The Under-pricing of Privatisation IPOs and IPOs 
Various empirical studies conducted on privately owned new issues identified 
two main phenomena: Positive initial returns of firms going public are under-priced 
and  second,  negative  long-run  under  performance  or  they  tend  to  under-perform 
benchmark  firms  in  the  long  run.  The  extent of under  pricing,  though,  has  varied 
from  study  to  study  due  to  the  different  number  of  IPOs  that  were  issued,  the 
methodology used and time periods examined [Prasad, et al. (1995)]. Ritter (1984), 
for  instance,  found  average  initial  returns  as  high  as  48  percent  for  a  15-month 
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both in the short and the in the long-run. On the other hand, Kendal and Stien (2004) 
document that the government IPOs is not, on average, under-priced more than the 
privately owned IPOs for the Australian market. 
There are only few studies comparing the price behaviour and the characteristics 
of Privatisation IPOs and private sector IPOs. These studies find contrasting empirical 
evidence though. Choi and Nam (1998) studied a large sample of 185 enterprises which 
were  privatised  in  30  markets  and  concluded  that  those  privatisations  IPOs  were  on 
average more under priced than IPOs in the private sector.  
Considering  information  asymmetry  for  UK  privatisations,  Meyah,  et  al. 
(1990)  proposed  that  UK  privatisation  should  not  possess  differential  information 
because of large amount of prior knowledge before going public. Contrary to their 
hypothesis, they found excess returns that significantly exceeded private sector IPO 
returns for initial and long run performance. Perotti and Guney (1993) found returns 
of  government  sector  IPOs  greater  than  non-government  IPO  for  eight  countries. 
Omran  (2004)  documents  significant  improvements  in  the  financial  and  operating 
performance of the newly privatised firms by the Egyptian government during 1994 
to 1998. On the other hand, Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) do not find evidence that 
privatisations in the seven countries, studied in the paper, tended to be under-priced 
more than the privately owned IPOs. In line with this were the results reported by 
Jelic and Briston (1999) for Hungarian and Easto and Pinder (1996) for Australian 
Public sector IPOs. In contrast, Ausennege (2000) and Paudyal et.al (1998) report 
higher  mean  initial  return  for  public  sector  IPOs  as  compared  to  privately-owned 
IPOs for Spain and Malaysia respectively.  
According  to  the  Asymmetric  information  theory,  uncertainty  associated  with  the 
value of the firm is negatively related to the size of the firm. As larger firms are better known 
to investors, they should be easier to value and, therefore, should experience a lower initial 
return, a sign of less under pricing. As Privatisation IPOs are expected to be larger than private 
sector IPOs, this theory also indicates that sector IPOs should be less underpriced as compared 
to the private sector IPOs. We, therefore, test the following hypotheses:  
H01:  The initial mean market-adjusted return of Privatisation IPOs in Pakistan, 
during the period under investigation, is lower as compared to the returns 
for private sector IPOs.  
H02:  The larger firms are less underpriced than the smaller firms; hence the initial 
market-adjusted return of large firms is significantly lower as compared to 
returns of small firms for Pakistan’s Market.  
Rittrer  (1991)  conclude  that  managers  of  the  issuing  firms  have  superior 
information about the true value and the future prospects of the offer than most of the 
outside investors. Ausennegg (2000) argues that these signalling models imply that high 
quality firms sell, at the time of the IPO, a low fraction of the share capital and purposely 
select an offer price below the intrinsic value in order to signal the firm’s quality to 
investors. This under-pricing is motivated by the possibility that the firm may achieve 
higher prices in subsequent offerings. The capital raised in future offering will more than 
compensate for the initial under pricing. On the basis of the above arguments, we test the 
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H03:  There  is  significant  negative  relationship,  for  Pakistani  IPOs,  during  the 
period under investigation, between the initial market-adjusted return and the 
portion of the share capital sold at time of the IPO.   
(b) Long-run Performance of Privatisation IPOs and Private Sector IPOs  
The share price performance of the privatisation and privately-owned IPOs in 
the long run have generally bee found to be dissimilar in empirical studies. Evidence 
tends to supports the notion that Private sector IPOs mainly experience a negative 
excess  return  over  the  first  three  to  four  years  of  aftermarket  trading,  whereas 
Privatisation IPOs mainly observe a better or an equal aftermarket performance to 
that of benchmark firms. For example, Megginson, et al. (2000) finds a significantly 
positive  aftermarket  performance  for  privatisations  using  a  large  sample  for  33 
countries.  Similar  results  are  reported  by  Jelic  and  Briston  (1999)  for  Hungarian 
Privatisation IPOs.  
For a country like Pakistan where it has perused a rigorous privatisation policy 
going public can be considered a recurring event and it may sell many firms over the 
period of the time. A government dedicated to the success of its privatisation policy will, 
therefore,  be  interested  in  a  good  long-run  performance  with  an  objective  to  attract 
investors  for  future  new  issues.  The  following  hypotheses  are,  therefore,  tested  for 
Pakistan's public sector IPOs:   
H04:  The  long-run  aftermarket  share  price  performance,  for  the  period  under 
investigation, is non-negative for Pakistan Privatisation IPOs.   
H05:  The long-run abnormal performance is significantly better for Privatisation 
IPOs  in  Pakistan,  during  the  period  under  investigation,  than  for  private 
sector IPOs.  
3. METHODOLOGY 
The study uses data for the period from 2000 to 2006. The main reason for using 
IPOs form 2000 to 2006 is that there were not many initial public offerings prior to 2000 
and, in fact, major privatisation took place during this period. We include in our sample 
those  companies  that  offered  shares  to  the  general  public  through  IPOs  and  exclude 
companies,  which  generated  equity  through  private  placements.  Moreover,  IPOs  of 
mutual funds of any type were excluded from the sample. The sample initially consisted 
of Eighty-Eight companies, which offered shares to general public through IPOs during 
the time period selected for the sample. Those companies, which came through mergers, 
and the mutual funds, were excluded from the sample. Also, only those companies were 
retained in the sample that has daily share price information available for at least 2 years 
after initial public offerings. Therefore, the final sample shrunk to 35 companies, seven of 
which  are  privatisation  IPOs  and  remaining  28  are  from  private  sector  IPOs.  The 
privatisation IPO companies are controlled by Government of Pakistan and for majority 
of them 100 percent of the ownership were held by the government prior to the issue. 
Table 1 presents details about privatisation and private sector IPOs during each year of 
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Table 1 
Years  All  PIPOs  IPOs 
2000  3  0  3 
2002  4  1  3 
2003  3  1  2 
2004  10  2  8 
2005  13  2  11 
2006  2  1  1 
Total  35  7  28 
Note: All stands for number of issues per year for the sample, PIPOs stands for Privatisation Initial Public 
Offerings and IPOs stands for Initial Public Offerings for private sector firms.   
Two  main sources were used to collect the data for the sample. First, Sample 
Company’s  IPO  announcement  history  was  sourced  from  the  online  database  of  the 
Karachi  Stock  Exchange  while  the  online  data  base  of  Business  recorder,  Pakistan's 
premier financial daily, was used to collect data on daily stock prices of the companies 
and the KSE-100 Index, for a period of two years for each company beginning from the 
formal enlisting on the Karachi Stock Exchange.   
Short-term Share Price Performance  
The objective of this paper is to analyse the price performance of Pakistan IPOs 
both in the short-run as well as in the long run. By short-run performance we mean the 
behaviour of the initial returns of the IPOs, that is, the return realised in the interval from 
the offering of the shares to the first trading day of the issue on the KSE. The long-run 
performance refers to the price behaviour of the newly issued shares beyond the day of 
their listing. In this study we analyse the long run performance over a period of two years 
after the listing day. We estimate simple (raw) returns as well as the market-adjusted 
returns over the various selected intervals.  
Following the methodology of Asussenegg (2000), the initial raw return for IPOj 
is given by:  
0 ,







…  …  …  …  …  …  …  (1) 
Where BHRj stands for Buy-and-Hold Returns for a company j, Pj,o is the issue price and 
Pj ,1 the closing price on the first trading day of IPOj. The time index t=0 refers to the 
first day of the subscription period. These returns measure the relative wealth gain (loss) 
an investor would have realised had he or she purchased an IPO at the offering price and 
sold at the prevailing market price at the close of the first trading day.   
Market-adjusted (Excess) Initial Returns  
Given the phenomenon that prices of individual stocks may move in response to 
the movement of the overall market, it is necessary that we also estimate market-adjusted 
returns for the same period that we used to calculate the raw returns. The market adjusted 
return (IRj) for each IPO j is measured as the difference between initial raw return (Buy-Rizwan and Khan  426
and-Hold Return for issue j) and the corresponding return on the market index (KSE-100 
Index) over the same period.  
j kse j j BHR BHR IR ,
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Similar to Equation (1) the Buy and Hold Returns for KSE-100 index ( j kse BHR , ) is 
calculated as:  
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…  …  …  …  …  (3) 
where KSEj,o represents the closing value of the KSE-100 Index on the first day of the 
subscription period of IPO j and KSEj,1 is the KSE-100 Index closing value at the close 
of the first trading day of the IPO j.    
Table 2 
Descriptive Summary Statistics of Initial (Short-term) Pakistani PIPOs  
and IPOs Returns from 2000 to 2006  
Initial Raw Return  Initial Market-Adjusted Return 
 
Panel: A  Panel: B  








t-statistic  4.20  2.64  5.19  3.81  5.36  2.46 
Median  21.302  68.333  10  15.567  75.519  7.87 
Maximum  270.736  131  270.736  240.353  134.376  240.353 
Minimum  –20.435  37.4  –20.435  –23.765  36.825  –23.765 
Std. Dev.  58.104  29.934  60.335  55.765  36.665  56.133 
Observations  35  7  28  35  7  28 
Note: All stands for number of issues per year for the sample, PIPOs stands for Privatisation Initial Public 
Offerings and IPOs stands for Initial Public Offerings for private sector firms. All the values are in 
percentages. The * indicates significance at 5 percent level.  
Table  2  presents  summary  statistics  of  the  raw  (Panel A)  and  market-adjusted 
initial returns (Panel B) for all three samples.  Mean return of 41.89 percent of initial raw 
returns shows that if investor invests equal amount of money in each IPO at the issue 
price and selling each IPO on its first trading day, he would have earned an average of 
41.89 percent raw return on its investment. On the other hand, if the investor had invested 
only in the privatisation IPOs, his or her investment would have yielded 77.28 percent 
percent raw return on his investment while the same strategy would have earned him 
32.57 percent raw return by investing only in the private sector IPOs of the sample firms. 
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price realise substantial wealth  gains by holding  these shares till the end of  the first 
trading day. 
Similar to initial raw returns, mean market-adjusted returns (Panel B, Table 2) for 
all three samples are positive: 36.47 percent for all, 74.33 percent for privatisation IPOs 
and 26.67 percent for private sector IPOs. These findings suggest that relative to the rest 
of the market Pakistan IPO investors realised substantial wealth gains for investors in 
case of initial market-adjusted returns. 
All mean returns reported in Panel A and B of Table 2 are significantly greater than 
zero at 5 percent significance level. Our results are in line to the findings reported in Sohail 
and Nasr (2007)  for  Pakistan’s market and  previous research  in  other  markets (see e.g, 
Aussenegg,  2000),  Pakistan’s  privatisation  IPOs  as  well  as  private  sectors  IPOs  are 
significantly under priced. Also, the results show that PIPOs are more under priced than IPOs.  
Difference of Means between Short-run Privatisation IPOs and  
    Private Sector IPOs Returns 
Table 3 reports results for the Difference of Means between Short-run PIPOs and 
IPOs Returns. As the Table 3 indicates that the initial mean raw and market-adjusted 
returns of privatisation IPOs are 45.25 percent and 47.67 percent above those of private 
sector  IPOs  respectively.  The  test  statistic  of  2.12  for  initial  market  adjusted  return 
indicates that the difference between returns of PIPOs and IPOs is statistically different 
from  zero.  However,  test  statistic  of  1.91  for  raw  return  difference  is  statistically 
insignificant. This indicates that privatisation IPOs are statistically significantly under 
priced more than the private sector IPOs. Hypothesis 1 which implies that the initial 
market  adjusted  return  of  privatisation  IPOs  is  lower  than  for  private  sector  IPOs, 
therefore, has to be rejected.   
Table 3 
Difference of Means between Short-run PIPOs and IPOs Returns 
Panel A: 
Difference between Raw PIPOs and IPOs Raw Returns                    
 
Mean 
   Initial Raw Return  45.26 
   t-statistic  1.91 
   p-values  0.07   
Panel B:  
Difference between Market-adjusted PIPOs and IPOs Returns  Mean 
   Initial Market-adjusted Return  47.67 
   t-statistic  2.12 
   p-values  0.04 
Note: Returns are in percentages. In panel A it is tested whether the difference in the mean initial returns 
between PIPOs and private sector IPOs are significantly different from zero. In panel B it is tested 
whether the difference in the mean market-adjusted between PIPOs and IPOs are statistically different 
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Multivariate Analysis  
Following the methodology of Aussenegg (2000), the following Ordinary Least 
Squares regression is performed on the data using initial (or first-day) market adjusted 
returns as the dependent variable. The market adjusted returns are calculated relative to 
KSE-100 Index.  
j j j j Size F IR 2 1 0  …  …  …  …  …  (4) 
Where IRj is initial market-adjusted return of issue j, Fj stands for Portion of the share 
capital sold at the initial offer (for H03), and Sizej is Logarithmic market value of issue j 
on the first trading day (for H02).  
Table 4 
Multivariate Cross-sectional Regression Analysis for Initial Excess  
Returns for the Whole Sample 
Model:  j j j j Size F IR 2 1 0 
F-statistic  11.741   
Prob. (F-statistic)  0.000   
R-squared  0.43  Adjusted R-squared  0.39     
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic  Prob. 
1 (Fraction)  421.54  2.85  0.01 
2 (Size)  32.77  4.67  0.00 
o  –760.39  –4.27  0.00 
 
Table 4  presents results for  Equation  (4). The coefficient  1  is positive and 
significant  for  Pakistan’s  private  sector  and  Privatisation  IPOs.  This  rejects  the 
hypothesis 3, which states that high quality firms sell less at the initial offer. The 
results indicate that pure signalling theory is not applicable for Pakistani privatisation 
and private sector IPOs. Secondly, the coefficient  2 (Size) is positive and significant 
which  indicates  that  larger  firms  experience  higher  initial  excess  returns  or, 
alternatively  stated,  higher  under  pricing.  This  contrasts  to  hypothesis  2.  Results 
indicate  that  Government  of  Pakistan  sold  large  and  well-known  enterprises  at  a 
lower  issue  price.  This  is  in  line  with  the  government’s  commitment  to  generate 
support for its privatisation program in particular by under pricing the state-owned 
enterprises, to benefit retail investors and to help develop capital markets in general. 
Overall, both the variables, the portion sold and size of the issue, are able to explain 
some  changes in  the  initial  excess returns for  Pakistan's  privatisations and  private 
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Tests for Long Term Performance  
This section examines the aftermarket performance of privatisation and private 
sector IPOs on the Karachi Stock Exchange by testing hypotheses 4, and 5 related to 
IPO's long-term performance. As stated earlier, long-run performance refers to the price 
behavior of the newly issued shares beyond the day of their listing. We estimate the 
simple (raw) returns by comparing the closing price of each IPO at the first trading day to 
the closing price at the end of each interval (one week, 2 weeks, 1 year and 2 years)
1. To 
calculate the post-listing performance of IPOs, buy-and-hold returns are calculated for 
each issue by the following equation:  
T
t
t j T j R BHR
2
, , 1 ) 1 (  …  …  …  …  …  …  (5) 
Where BHRj,T stands for buy-and-hold returns for a company j at time t, Rj,t is the return 
of IPO j in period t and t=2 represents the second trading day in the after market. T = 1 
week, 2 weeks, 1 year and 2 years.  
These returns measure the relative wealth gain (loss) of an investor who purchased 
an IPO at the market price of the first trading day and sold it at the end of the respective 
interval.  From  an  investor  point  of  view,  these  returns  can  indicate  whether  the 
opportunities for profits from investing in Pak IPOs extend to late buyers of IPO or are 
exhausted at the time of the public offering.   
Market Adjusted (Excess) Returns  
To calculate the abnormal performance of IPO after the first trading day in the 
market, KSE-100 (value-weighted) index is used in this paper as a benchmark. Similar to 




t j kse T j kse R BHR
2
, , , , 1 ) 1 (  …  …  …  …  …  (6) 
Rkse,j ,t is the return on KSE-100 Index in period t where t =2 indicates the second 
trading day of the IPO in the market. 
Abnormal buy-and-hold returns (ABHRs) are used in the paper to measure the 
market-adjusted  performance.  To  calculate  the  market-adjusted  returns,  we  simply 
subtract the market return from the simple return of each respective interval. ABHRs are 
thus defined by the following equation:  
T j kse T j T j BHR BHR ABHR , , , ,
 
 
…  …  …  …  …  (7) 
Table 5 presents aftermarket performance for All IPOs, PIPOs and IPOs. Panel 
A refers to the raw returns whereas panel B refers to the market- adjusted (excess) 
returns. Column 1 shows different specifications of the returns, column 2 the average 
and  median  returns  for  each  interval  for  the  whole  sample,  column 3  and 4  the   
1Same methodology was also followed by  Aussenegg (2000). Rizwan and Khan  430
Table 5 










Period  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Panel A: Simple (Raw) Returns 
BHR  1 Week  1.56  0.34  –2.73  0.29  2.67  0.39    
(0.82)   (–1.02)   (1.19)    
2 Weeks  –3.11  –2.1  –4.35  –6.44  –2.79  –1.64    
(–0.79)   (–0.64)   (–0.59)    
1 Year  30.68  –9.17  31.08  51.87  30.57  –19    
(2.05)   (1.58)   (1.67)    
2 Years  63.87  13.05  109.7  138.81  51.98  1.91    
(3.23)   (2.8)   (2.31)           
KSE  1 Week  0.92  0.96  –0.4  –0.54  1.27  1.85    
(1.05)   (–0.31)   (1.21)    
2 Weeks  2.12  3.04  1.64  4.36  2.25  2.88    
(2.25)   (0.68)   (2.17)    
1 Year  41.94  42.74  45.69  44.03  40.97  41.16    
(7.76)   (5.5)   (6.29)    
2 Years  87.55  77.27  97.02  99.8  85.09  77.27    
(8.43)   (4.77)   (7.03)  
Panel B: Market-adjusted (Excess) Returns 
ABHR  1 Week  0.64  1.07  –2.33  1.16  1.41  0.98    
(0.34)   (–1.08)   (0.61)     
2 Weeks  –5.24  –3.89  –5.99  –2.44  –5.04  –4.29    
(–1.37)   (–0.9)   (–1.11)     
1 Year  –11.26  –53.49  –14.61  –2.81  –10.4  –59.84    
(–0.78)   (–0.89)   (–0.58)     
2 Years  –23.68  –45.98  12.69  19.77  –33.11  –56.82    
(–1.26)   (0.52)   (–1.46)   
Note: BHR stands for buy-and-hold raw return, KSE represents KSE-100 Index returns and ABHR stands for 
Abnormal buy-and-hold returns calculated by Equation (7). ‘All’ stands for all IPO sample issues, PIPO 
represents privatisation Initial Public Offerings, IPOs stands for public sector Initial Public Offerings. 
BHR are calculated by Equation (5). All mean and median values are in percentages. T-stat in parenthesis  
average and median returns for PIPOs and IPOs respectively. As shown in Table 5, 
the average simple (raw) returns one week and two weeks after listing is 1.56 percent 
and –3.11 percent respectively. The negative average simple returns for two weeks 
interval indicate that investing in Pak IPOs by buying after the offering period is not 
a profitable strategy, at least, in the short run. For the intervals of 12 and 24 months 
after  listing,  the  average  simple  returns  are  30.68  percent  and  68.87  percent 
respectively. As shown by many such other studies [see e.g., Aussenegg (2000)], the 
short  run  aftermarket  performance  (for  the  first  one  and  two  weeks)  is  not 
statistically significant. The Annual Buy-and-Hold return over the first two weeks for 
a sample of all issues is -5.24 percent. Similarly, we observe negative short run (one 
week  and  two  week  period  returns)  abnormal  returns  for  privatisation  as  well  as 
private  sector  IPOs.  The  statistically  insignificant  short-run  results  show  that  the 
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trading begins in the shares of the company. This implies that for Pakistan's IPOs 
there is full price adjustment in the short run. The long run aftermarket performance 
for the first two years shows some differences among the three samples.  
An Investor who bought the shares of the IPO at the closing price on the first 
trading day in the market and held it for one year, earned mean and median excess 
returns of 11.26  percent and 14.61 percent respectively. The average excess returns 
corresponds to –23.68 percent for holding period of two years. In contrast, the two-
year long-run performance of privatisation IPOs is not only positive (12.69 percent) 
but  also  very  large  when  compared  with  the  mean  return  of  private  sector  IPOs, 
which is negative (–33.11 percent), though both the values are not significant. The 
hypothesis 4 (long-run non-negative PIPOs performance) can therefore, be accepted 
on the basis of above results.  
The positive long  run  performance  of  Pakistan’s  privatisation  IPOs,  which 
has  been  remarkably  better  than  the  private  sector  IPOs  in  Pakistan's  market,  is 
indication for a market-oriented government. Privatisation IPOs provide significant 
mean (raw) 2-year return of 109.70 percent. This is almost two times higher than 
the average returns of private sector IPOs. Like Privatisation IPOs, private sector 
IPOs  also  experience  statistically  significant  unadjusted  average  returns  for  the 
first  two  years.  The  mean  ABHR  is  -31.11  percent  (Table  5).  Pakistani  private 
sector IPOs therefore, tend to under perform in the long run. This is in contrast to 
the long run performance of privatisation IPOs that out perform the market in the 
long  run  with  mean  excess  return  of  12.69  percent,  though  it  is  statistically 
insignificant (Table 5).  
Hypothesis 5 states that Pakistan’s PIPOs experience better long run abnormal 
performance than their private sector IPOs. The results for hypothesis are reported in 
Table 6. The table reveals that the 2-year abnormal performance difference (difference in 
ABHRs) is positive (45.79 percent) but statistically insignificant. Therefore, we reject 
hypothesis 5. This result is in line with findings for Malaysia [see e.g, Paudayal, et. al 
(1998)] and Poland [Aussenegg (2000)].  
Table 6 
Test for Differences in the Long-run Aftermarket Performance 
Difference between Privatisation IPOs and Private Sector IPOs  (PIPOs minus IPOs)  
BHR  ABHR 
Period  Issues  
1 Year  0.5071  –4.21359 
t-statistic  0.013502  0.116052 
p-values   0.989311  0.908337 
2 Years  57.7216  45.7964 
t-statistic  1.187912  0.984663 
p-values   0.243611  0.332176 
Note: This table provides mean differences between privation IPOs and private sector IPOs (PIPOs minus IPOs) 
for buy-and-hold (BHRs) and abnormal buy-and-hold returns (ABHRs). Rizwan and Khan  432
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the short and long run price behaviour of Privatisation and 
private sector IPOs in Pakistan. Privatisation process in Pakistan got tremendous boost 
and momentum during the Musharaf regime and many large and profitable firms were 
privatised in the last few years, particularly at a time when the overall climate in the 
country  was  responsive  and  conducive  for  investment.  The  government,  however, 
privatised many firms through public offerings on an individual case basis.   
The study uses data for the period from 2000 to 2006 as major privatisation took place 
during this period. Short and long run IPO performances were measured and examined in 
the  context  of  privatisation  and  private  sector  IPOs.  Empirical  results  of  this  study 
indicate that privatisation IPOs are statistically significantly under priced more than the 
private  sector  IPOs  in  the  short  run.  The  difference  between  mean  market-adjusted 
returns of Public sector and private sector IPOs is statistically different from zero. H01 
was,  therefore,  rejected.  A  multivariate  cross-sectional  analysis  reveals  that,  pure 
signaling models can not be used to explain the initial excess returns of Pakistani Public 
and private sector IPOs. One plausible explanation for this result might be that, given a 
higher political uncertainty, a government may be tempted to selling a large portion to 
transfer control rights credibly. This was the case when government of Pakistan sold 26 
percent  stake  in  Pakistan  Telecommunication,  a  telecom  giant  in  Pakistan  and  also 
transferred control rights with the sale. Secondly, the initial excess return of all IPOs has 
positive relation with firm size which indicates that larger firms experience higher initial 
excess returns. Results indicate that Government of Pakistan sold big and well-known 
enterprises at a lower issue price. This is in line with the government’s commitment to 
generate support for its privatisation program in particular and to develop capital markets 
in general. A positive long run price performance of Pakistan's public sector IPOs is 
indication for a market- oriented government. The long-run share price performance of 
public sector IPOs has been remarkably better than the private sector IPOs in Pakistan's 
market.   
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